Belk v. United States: Obtaining Monetary Relief for Americans Held Hostage In Iran by Schwartz, David L.
American University International Law Review
Volume 4 | Issue 1 Article 7
1989
Belk v. United States: Obtaining Monetary Relief
for Americans Held Hostage In Iran
David L. Schwartz
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Schwartz, David L. "Belk v. United States: Obtaining Monetary Relief for Americans Held Hostage In Iran." American University
International Law Review 4, no. 1 (1989): 207-239.
BELK v. UNITED STATES: OBTAINING MONETARY
RELIEF FOR AMERICANS HELD HOSTAGE IN IRAN
David L. Schwartz*
INTRODUCTION
Iran seized and detained fifty-one American hostages from Novem-
ber 4, 1979 to January 20, 1981, a period of over thirteen months.'
Although the Iranian hostage crisis occurred over seven years ago, hos-
tage taking is still a popular means through which terrorists attempt to
obtain money, weapons, and international recognition. 2 On various oc-
casions, negotiations have secured the release of hostages. 3 Occasion-
ally, a state prosecutes a terrorist.4 Rarely, however, do the hostages or
their families receive a remedy for their sufferings.5 This Case-Com-
ment focuses on the frustrations that hostages experience in obtaining
monetary compensation when the captors are agents of a foreign sover-
eign state.
When President Jimmy Carter signed the Algerian Accords,' he dis-
missed the liability of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the seizure of
the American hostages.7 On February 24, 1981, President Ronald Rea-
* J.D. Candidate, 1989, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 732 (1987), a.fd, No. 87-1631 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96753) (to be reported at 858
F.2d 706).
2. See Iran Plays the Hostage Game, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 1987, at 34 (noting the
continuing problem of hostage taking in Beirut by supporters of the Iranian Islamic
movement). The above article stated that eight Americans and sixteen other foreigners
were captured and held hostage in Beirut. Id.
3. But see id. at 36 (suggesting that making concessions to Iran for hostages has
not solved the problems of hostage taking, and may have even sparked more
kidnappings).
4. See West Germany to Prosecute Terrorist, 87 DEP'T ST. Buu.. 85 (Aug. 1987)
(noting White House approval for West Germany's decision to prosecute Mohammed
Hamadei to the full extent of the law for hijacking and taking hostages on TWA flight
847).
5. See infra notes 212-21 and accompanying text (discussing the infrequent and
inadequate ex gratia settlements that are sometimes given to terrorist victims for their
suffering).
6. Declaration of the Government and of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981, § 11, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 224, 227 (1981) (hereinafter Gen-
eral Declaration].
7. Id. The General Declaration explicitly precludes any claims against Iran arising
out of the seizure and detention of the American hostages, under United States law,
Iranian law, or international law. Id.
Under the terms of the Algerian Accords, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
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gan ratified the Algerian Accords, making the Accords binding on the
United States.' With the signing of the Accords the hostages gained
their freedom, but lost their ability to bring private actions against
Iran.'
In response to the prohibition on private actions, some of the former
hostages brought suit against the United States under the takings
clause of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution." The
hostages argued that President Carter, acting in his executive capacity,
destroyed their viable tort claims against Iran without giving the hos-
tages just compensation." The United States Claims Court dismissed
Belk v. United States,12 and subsequently, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Claim's
Court. 3
Part I of this Case-Comment offers a background on the takings
has the power to arbitrate American and Iranian unresolved commercial claims against
one another relating to contracts or debts. Declaration of the Government of the Demo-
cratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Re-
public of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, art. II, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 230, 320-31 (1981) [here-
inafter Settlement of Claims]. Decisions of the tribunal are final and binding on the
parties. Id. art. IV. See Note, The United States-Iran Accords and the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, 68 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1539-40 (1982) [hereinafter Note, The
U.S.-Iran Accords] (discussing various aspects of the claims settlement).
Many commentators have questioned the validity of the Algerian Accords. See The
U.S./lIranian Hostage Settlement, 1981 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 236, 237 [hereinafter The
U.S.-Iran Hostage Settlement] (questioning the enforceability of the Accords under
coercion and duress, but noting that the President's ratification of the Accords makes
the issue of validity merely academic); Note, The Iranian Hostage Agreement Under
International and United States Law, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 822, 837 (1981) (comment-
ing that settlement of a treaty through coercion may violate international law, and may
make the treaty void).
8. Exec. Order No. 12,294, 31 C.F.R. § 535.216 (1981), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. §
1707 (1982).
9. General Declaration, supra note 6, art. 11.
10. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732 (1987), affid, No. 87-1631 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at 858
F.2d 706); U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 732-33 (1987), affd, No. 87-1631 (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at
858 F.2d 706). The fifth amendment states that the government shall not take property
for a public purpose without giving just compensation for the property. U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
12. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 736 (1987), afl'd, No. 87-1631 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at 858
F.2d 706).
13. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732 (1987), afid, No. 87-1631 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at 858
F.2d 706). The Federal Circuit Court wholeheartedly adopted the decision of the
Claims Court, affirming the summary judgment in favor of the United States, as well
as agreeing with the takings clause and political question analyses. Id.
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clause and the political question doctrine, and reviews relevant prior
case law. Part II examines the summary judgment proceedings in Belk
v. United States.14 Part III scrutinizes the takings clause and political
question analyses of the United States Claims Court. Part IV analyzes
the decision of the Claims Court and suggests that the Federal Circuit
Court should have reversed and remanded the case back to the United
States Claims Court.
Part V of this Case-Comment analyzes a central issue which would
have arisen had the Federal Circuit Court remanded the case. The is-
sue on remand would be whether the hostages' claims against Iran did,
in fact, constitute property. To prove that their claims constituted prop-
erty, the hostages will have to demonstrate that they would have been
able to acquire jurisdiction over the Islamic Republic of Iran in a fed-
eral district court. Part V, therefore, addresses the difficulties of ob-
taining jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign state. Additionally, Part V
serves as a practical jurisdictional guide for international human rights
attorneys for future hostage or terrorist victim cases. Part VI discusses
the various remedies available to the hostages, and Part VII sets forth




The fifth amendment takings clause precludes the federal govern-
ment from taking private property for public use without adequate
compensation. 15 In a just compensation analysis, plaintiffs must first
prove that their claims constitute property."6 Second, plaintiffs must
prove that the United States took the property for a public use without
14. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 7 n.3, Belk v. United States,
12 CI. Ct. 732 (1987), aftd, No. 87-1631 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW,
CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at 858 F.2d 706) [hereinafter Gov-
ernment's Brief].
15. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. See, e.g., Aris Gloves, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d
1386, 1386 (Ct. CI. 1970) (holding that no taking occurred while the United States
was in a state of war); Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601, 602 (Ct. Cl. 1955)
(noting that damage to an American citizen's estate in Austria is a taking). Cf. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 213
(1965) (stating that the American Law Institute has not decided whether the execu-
tive's settlement of a citizen's claim against a foreign state for less than the value of the
claim is a compensable taking).
16. Pub. Water Supply Dist. No. 3 v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 887, 890 (Ct.
Cl. 1955).
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giving the property owners just compensation."7
In a recent takings clause case, Shanghai Power Co. v. United
States, 8 the President settled the plaintiff's claim against the People's
Republic of China [PRC], and thereby extinguished the plaintiff's
claim against the PRC for the excess amount due."9 The parties cross-
moved for summary judgment. 20 The United States Claims Court held
that the plaintiff's lost claim constituted property, and the value of that
property was greater than the amount that the plaintiff received in the
executive settlement.2'
In deciding whether justice and fairness require that plaintiffs re-
ceive compensation for the taking of their property, the court in Shang-
hai Power Co. v. United States offered five factors to examine.22 The
five factors are: (1) the degree to which the government impaired the
property owner's rights; (2) the extent to which the property owner is
an incidental beneficiary of the governmental action; (3) the impor-
tance of the public interest that the governmental action would serve;
(4) whether the governmental action is novel or unexpected, or falls
within traditional boundaries; and (5) whether the governmental action
17. Id.; Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 242 (1983), affd
mem., 765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985). A taking is more
likely to exist if the government physically takes or invades someone's property, and is
less likely to exist when the governmental action is in accordance with public policy to
benefit the public. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978). Accord Pacific R.R. v. United States, 120 U.S. 227, 235 (1887) (denyifig com-
pensation for a takings claim because of military necessity, and a strong government
interest).
See also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674 n.6 (1981) (holding that the
return of Iranian assets did not constitute a taking because the assets were frozen
under an executive order); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
137 (1978) (refusing to grant compensation when plaintiffs have an alternative re-
course such as the right to build elsewhere); E-Systems, Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct.
271, 278 (1983) (holding that the plaintiff, not having exhausted all remedies, namely
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, is not entitled to compensation because the
plaintiff has not yet suffered an injury).
Most takings clause cases relating to the Iranian crisis concern commercial claims
regarding Iranian assets in the United States, and various contractual obligations that
the United States companies sought to enforce in United States federal courts. See
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674 (1981) (stating plaintiffs argument that
regulation nullifying attachments constitutes a taking of property interests in assets,
but holding that there was no compensable taking); Note, The U.S.-Iran Accords,
supra note 7, at 1540 (commenting that a taking may exist if the result of arbitration
in the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal is unsatisfactory).
18. Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237 (1983), affrd mem., 765
F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985).
19. Id. at 239.
20. Id. at 239.
21. Id. at 241-42.
22. Id. at 242-43.
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substituted any rights or remedies for those that it destroyed.23 In a
motion for summary judgment, if any of the five factors presents a tria-
ble issue of fact, a court may not grant the motion for summary judg-
ment.24 If no triable issue of fact exists, the court must weigh the five
factors to determine if, as a matter of law, compensation is in the inter-
est of justice and fairness.20
B. POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
A judicial decision on the takings issue is not limited to the five-
factor test, but may also depend upon the particular facts of each
case.16 A determination on the particular facts of each case provides
the court with flexibility to decide the takings issue for other reasons,
such as whether the court is interfering with the President's role in
foreign policy."' Judicial deference to the executive involves the invoca-
tion of the political question doctrine.28 The political question doctrine
limits the ability of a federal court to review the acts of other branches
of government.2 9 Many courts have granted the executive exclusive
power to execute settlements in the area of foreign relations, thereby
23. Id.
24. See Belk v. United States, 12 CI. Ct. 732, 733 (1987) (reiterating that sum-
mary judgment is only appropriate when there are no triable issues of fact), aff'd, No.
87-1631 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to
be reported at 858 F.2d 706).
25. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (stating that the government is
subject to "justice and fairness"); Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 733 (1987)
(citing with affirmation the language in Andrus v. Allard), aff'd, No. 87-1631 (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at
858 F.2d 706).
26. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(noting that courts will inquire about the government's failure to adequately compen-
sate on a case-by-case basis).
27. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 735-36 (1987), aff'd, No. 87-1631 (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at
858 F.2d 706).
28. Id.
29. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1961) (stating that it is the responsi-
bility of the court to determine whether a political question exists). The political ques-
tion doctrine operates principally as a function of the separation of powers. Id. Baker v.
Carr held that to determine if the issue is a nonjusticiable political question, the issue
clearly must show a constitutional commitment of a coordinate political department to
handle the issue; or have no judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or that the issue is impossible to decide without a policy determination of
nonjudicial discretion; or that the issue is impossible to resolve without ignoring the
duties of the other branches of government; or need an unquestioning adherence to an
already made political decision; or have the potential of embarrassing other branches of
government because various departments made multifarious pronouncements on one
question. Id. at 217.
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limiting judicial review of foreign policy matters." For example, in
Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, although the claims court of-
fered five factors to analyze the takings clause issue, the court's pri-
mary rationale for holding for the government was based upon the po-
litical question doctrine.3 The court was wary of interfering in the
secret diplomatic functions of the executive.32
Not all courts perceive that takings claims that are based upon an
inadequate executive settlement interfere with sensitive diplomatic ne-
gotiations.3 3 In E-Systems, Inc. v. United States,34 a takings clause
case in which E-Systems sought damages for Iran's default on contrac-
tual obligations, 3 5 the United States Claims Court did not find a politi-
cal question and denied the government's summary judgment motion.3 0
The court, not focusing on the executive's diplomatic function, saw lit-
tle difference between a presidential taking in the area of foreign pol-
icy, and a legislative taking involving only national interests. 7 The
court held that a governmental taking does not require a physical act.38
The court, however, could not rule on the takings issue because E-Sys-
tems had not exhausted all available fora.3 9 The court suspended the
proceedings until the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal heard E-Sys-
30. See generally Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669-74 (1981) (hold-
ing that the President was authorized to nullify attachments and transfer Iranian as-
sets); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (claiming that the executive's
decision regarding the Litvinov Assignment is conclusive on the courts); United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 326-27 (1936) (holding that legislative action
delegating to the President the power to use an embargo on the sale of arms is valid).
Both the Curtiss-Wright and Pink decisions stated that the President was the sole or-
gan of the federal government in the area of foreign relations. United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-
20 (1936). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 721, Reporter's note 8 (1986) (stating that courts are reluctant to question
the political judgment of the executive that the settlement is in the best interests of
both the claimants and the United States).
31. Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 243-49 (1983), affd
mem., 765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985).
32. Id. at 247-49.
33. See E-Systems, Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 271, 274 (1983) (holding that
the government failed to establish as a matter of law that no taking resulted under the
fifth amendment from its blocking of assets in the United States in which the Iranian
government had an interest); Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (holding that the political question doctrine is ultimately rooted in concern
for separation of powers and controls political questions, and not political cases).
34. E-Systems, Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 271 (1983).
35. Id. at 272.
36. Id. at 275.
37. Id. at 275.
38. Id. at 276.
39. Id. at 278.
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tems' claim for damages against Iran.'0
In another case, Langenegger v. United States,1 the Federal Circuit
Court held that the issue of whether the government extinguished the
plaintiffs' claim against El Salvador was justiciable. 41 The court did not
invoke the political question doctrine.4 3 The court clarified its affirma-
tion of Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, stating that Shanghai
Power did not hold that the executive's extinguishment of a claim
44against a foreign state always raises a nonjusticiable takings issue.
Instead, the court must look to the specific facts of each case .4 The
specific facts of Langenegger did not give rise to a political question.4
Incidentally, the court in Langenegger v. United States did not hold in
favor of the plaintiffs on their takings claim.47 Because the plaintiffs
failed to exhaust all possible fora in which they could bring a claim, the
court held that the government could not have extinguished the plain-
tiffs' claim.48
In the above takings clause cases, courts have used a five-part tak-
ings clause analysis, and do not always invoke the political question
doctrine. Courts employ the five-part analysis as a guide to determine
whether a taking of property occurred without just compensation.
Moreover, when the governmental act is an inadequate settlement of a
plaintiff's claim against a foreign state, courts do not always invoke the
political question doctrine.
II. FACTS OF BELK V. UNITED STATES
On November 4, 1979, Iran seized and detained fifty-one American
hostages for 444 days.48 The tort claims of the hostages against the
Islamic Republic of Iran included false imprisonment, assault and bat-
tery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consor-
tium."° The Algerian Accords, however, explicitly barred all claims
against Iran relating to the seizure of the hostages,"' and the hostages
40. Id. at 284.
41. Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
42. Id. at 1570.
43. Id.





49. See Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 732 (1987) (detailing background of
hostages' claims), affd, No. 87-1631 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA
database. 1099 WL 96763) (to be reported at 858 F.2d 706).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 732-33. When President Reagan signed the Algerian Accords, he, in ef-
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appeared to have no remedy available to them.
In Belk v. United States, eleven hostages and two spouses filed a
complaint against the United States in the United States Claims
Court, 52 asserting that the presidential settlement of the Algerian Ac-
cords constituted a governmental taking of property for public use
without adequate compensation. 53 The United States moved for sum-
mary judgment,54 arguing that no triable issues of fact existed,", and
that, as a matter of law, the settlement between the United States and
Iran did not constitute a taking of the hostages' claims without just
compensation.56 Alternatively, the government argued that the execu-
tive's settlement of the Algerian Accords was not subject to judicial
review. 5
7
fect, dismissed all hostage claims against Iran. General Declaration, supra note 6, art.
11.
52. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 732 (1987), afj'd, No. 87-1631 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database. 1099 WL 96763) (to be reported at 858
F.2d 706). The Tucker Act grants the Claims Court jurisdiction in cases based upon
the Constitution, including cases regarding damages for takings clause violations. 28
U.S.C. § 1491 (1982). See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 689-90 (1981)
(holding that the Tucker Act does not preclude jurisdiction over takings claims relating
to the Algerian Accords); In Re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684
F.2d 1301, 1310-11 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that the treaty exception provision in sec-
tion 1502 must be construed narrowly, so as not to allow a takings claim based on the
Warsaw Convention). But see 28 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982) (denying jurisdiction in the
United States Claims Court when a claim against the United States grows out of or is
dependent upon any treaty with a foreign nation). The treaty exception, however, does
not seem to bar the hostages' suit against the United States because courts have con-
strued the treaty exception very narrowly. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534
F.2d 889, 902-06 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
53. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 732-33 (1987), aff'd, No. 87-1631 (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at
858 F.2d 706).
54. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 732-33 (1987), affd, No. 87-1631 (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at
858 F.2d 706). Under rule 56 of the Rules of the Claims Court, a party moving for
summary judgment must prove that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,
and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. R. CL. CT. 56, 28 U.S.C. §
774 (1982). A court may grant summary judgment only if there are no disputes as to
material fact, and judgment is appropriate as a matter of law. Weide v. United States,
4 Cl. Ct. 432, 435 (1984), a]J'd, 765 F.2d 157 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822
(1985).
55. Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment at 1, Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732 (1987), afJ'd, No. 87-1631
(Fed. Circ. Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be
reported at 858 F.2d 706) [hereinafter Government's Reply Brief].
56. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl, Ct. 732, 733 (1987), afJfd, No. 87-1631 (Fed. Cir.
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III. COURT'S ANALYSIS
In Belk v. United States, the United States government moved for
summary judgment.58 The United States Claims Court held for the
government, effectively dismissing the hostages' complaint.5 9 In its de-
cision, the United States Claims Court addressed two issues. 0 The first
issue was whether the government's signing of the Algerian Accords,
which extinguished the hostages' tort claims against Iran, constituted a
taking of the hostages' property without just compensation.6 1 The sec-
ond issue was whether the court had the power of judicial review in a
case involving the executive's role in foreign policy. 2
The court first addressed the takings clause issue. Prior to con-
ducting a thorough takings clause analysis, the court focused on the
intangible nature of the property, a tort claim, and questioned whether
there was a physical invasion of the alleged property. 3 Thus, the court
began its takings clause examination with a presumption that the non-
physical governmental act of destroying the intangible property, a tort
claim, was not a taking."'
The United States Claims Court then turned to the five-part takings
clause test. 5 Regarding the first factor, the degree of impairment of
the property rights, the court noted the government's admission that
the hostages' claims were completely destroyed."6 As to the second fac-
tor, whether the property owners were an incidental beneficiary of the
governmental action, the court found that the freed hostages unques-
tionably benefited from the Accords.67 Regarding the third factor, the
court determined that a strong public and governmental interest in
signing the Algerian Accords existed.68 As to the fourth factor, the
court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the exercise of governmental
power was novel and unexpected. 9 In this regard, the court held that
the hostages had no expectations of compensation."0 Regarding the fifth
factor, whether the governmental action substituted any rights or reme-
58. Id. at 736.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 733.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 733-34.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 733.
66. Id. at 734.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 734.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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dies for those that it destroyed, the court pointed out that the Algerian
Accords secured the release of the hostages.7 That is, the substituted
remedy for the hostages was their freedom.71 The court determined
that there were no triable issues of fact regarding any of the five fac-
tors," and therefore concluded that, as a matter of law, the Accords
did not constitute a taking of property without just compensation.74
The United States Claims Court next addressed the question of judi-
cial review. The court held that the political question doctrine barred it
from reviewing the executive's decisions in sensitive foreign policy mat-
ters. 5 The court did not seek to question the ability of the President to
conduct foreign relations for fear that such second guessing would hin-
der the executive's diplomatic function.78 Therefore, the court held that
the takings clause action against the dismissal of the hostages' tort
claims against Iran was a non-justiciable political question.77
IV. WRITER'S ANALYSIS
A. TAKINGS CLAUSE
Because the government conceded, for the purposes of the motion for
summary judgment, that the claim constituted property, the Claims
Court did not question whether the tort claim was a property interest. 8
Rather than proceeding directly to a takings clause analysis, the
United States Claims Court, choosing to interpret a taking narrowly,
focused on the intangible nature of the governmental act.79 Because the
dismissal of the hostages' claims did not constitute an actual physical
invasion of property, the court found that the nature of the governmen-
tal act did not "readily suggest that a taking ha[d] occurred." 8 E-
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 734-35.
74. Id. The court stated that the United States "should not be held as a surrogate
for Iran's unjustifiable actions." Id. The court declared that Iran, and not the United
States, took the hostages' freedom by holding them captive. Id. at 735.
75. Id. at 735-36.
76. Id. at 736.
77. Id. at 735-36.
78. See id. at 733 (noting that the United States conceded that the plaintiffs' claim
constituted property for the purposes of the summary judgment motion).
79. Id.
80. Id. The government made a similar argument focusing on the non-physical at-
tributes of ceding the hostages potential tort claims against Iran, as opposed to the
physical nature of most eminent domain cases. Government's Brief, supra note 14, at 8.
See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (noting
that when the governmental act involves a physical invasion of property, the court has
an easier time, conceptually, in finding that a taking has occurred).
[VOL. 4:207
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Systems, Inc. v. United States and other prior case law demonstrate,
however, that a taking may occur when the government does not take
physical possession of property.8' Accordingly, the United States
Claims Court should not have concentrated on the physical nature of
the governmental act as a justification for denying the hostages their
takings clause claim.
The United States Claims Court then examined the five-part takings
clause test, which the United States Claims Court enumerated in
Shanghai Power Co. v. United States. 2 The first factor of the five-part
takings clause analysis examines the degree to which the government
impaired the property owner's rights.8 3 If the property maintained a
substantial amount of its value after the governmental act occurred,
then the act would not constitute a taking.'" Even if the court required
that the claimants prove that the United States, in signing the Algerian
Accords, took one hundred percent of their property without compensa-
tion, the plaintiffs could meet this standard.8 The Algerian Accords
precluded the hostages from suing Iran, thereby destroying one hun-
dred percent of their property interests.8 This factor presents no tria-
ble issue of fact because the government agreed that the hostages com-
81. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 n.25
(1978) (rejecting the notion that a taking only occurs with physical possession of a
piece of tangible property); In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684
F.2d 1301, 1312 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that property interests include compensation
claims); Randall v. H. Nakashima & Co., Ltd., 542 F.2d 270, 275 (5th Cir. 1976)
(finding that a tort claim may constitute property even when there is debate as to
liability); United States v. Hubbell, 323 F.2d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 1963) (holding that a
tort claim can constitute property); E-Systems, Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 271,
276 (1983) (noting that the government need not take physical possession of property
for a taking to occur); The U.S.fIranian Hostage Settlement, supra note 7, at 239
(commenting that the tort claims of the hostages may be defined as property).
But see Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 240 (1983), afd mem.,
765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985) (stating that the claimant
only possesses a property interest as long as the interest is a legally enforceable right,
and does not contradict United States foreign policy).
82. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 733 (1987), afd, No. 87-1631 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at 858
F.2d 706) (citing Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 240 (1983),
affd mem., 765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985)).
83. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 733 (1987), aOd, No. 87-1631 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at 858
F.2d 706).
84. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (holding that the Court views
a property owner's rights in its entirety, and if the government destroys only one strand
of a property owner's bundle of rights, then a taking does not exist).
85. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 734 (1987), affd, No. 87-1631 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at 858
F.2d 706).
86. Treas. Reg. 31 C.F.R. § 535.216 (1981); General Declaration, supra note 6.
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pletely lost their ability to sue Iran in tort.8 7 Therefore, as a matter of
law, the first factor supports a judgment in favor of the hostages. 88
The second factor of the five-part takings clause test analyzes the
extent to which the property owner is an incidental beneficiary of the
governmental action. 89 In deciding the extent of benefit, the court must
determine who the principal beneficiaries are." Accordingly, the
United States Claims Court examined the amount of benefit that the
hostages received as a result of the Algerian Accords. 91 The court de-
termined that the hostages had benefited from the President's settle-
ment of their claims by receiving their freedom.92
The United States Claims Court, however, failed to account for the
degree of benefit that other parties received. For example, the commer-
cial claimants who had contractual obligations with Iran received a fo-
rum for arbitration-the United States-Iran Claims Tribunal. 3 Also,
the American public gained an advantage through the achievement of
important foreign policy objectives, 4 which included the settlement of
a source of friction between the United States and Iran. 5
In Belk v. United States, however, the government contended that
the Algerian Accords primarily benefited the hostages9" because the
Accords directly gave the hostages their freedom, and indirectly gave
them the benefit of an improved foreign policy. 97 The United States
Claims Court agreed and held that the hostages were the principal ben-
eficiaries, and the public was only an incidental beneficiary of the Alge-
87. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 734 (1987), aff'd, No. 87-1631 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at 858
F.2d 706).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 733.
90. Id. at 734.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Settlement of Claims, supra note 7, arts I, II.
94. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (stating that when the
government action benefits the public, the loss should be placed on the public).
95. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 734 (1987), aff'd, No. 87-1631 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at 858
F.2d 706).
96. Government's Brief, supra note 14, at 13-14. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978) (stating that a balancing test, weighing
all the relevant factors, determines whether the government's action is for public or
private benefit); see also YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 92 (1969) (holding
that in a takings clause analysis, to ascertain whether compensation is required, the
court must determine if the governmental action was sufficiently directed to the prop-
erty damage).
97. Government's Brief, supra note 14, at 13-14.
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rian Accords.98 A triable issue of fact remained as to who was the pri-
mary beneficiary of the governmental action.
The third factor of the five-part takings clause analysis determines
the importance of the public interest that the governmental action
would serve.9 The government argued that the Algerian Accords
served an important public purpose, and therefore, could not constitute
a taking. 00 The court, however, did not specifically state whether the
settlement of the plaintiffs' claims constituted a substantial public pur-
pose. Assuming that the court did view the Accords as constituting a
substantial public purpose, the court would logically have to determine
that the government benefited greatly from the Accords. This finding
should help raise a triable issue of fact as to the second factor, which
was whether the public or the hostages were the principal beneficiaries
of the Accords.
The fourth factor is whether the exercise of governmental power is
novel and unexpected, or whether it falls within traditional bounda-
ries.10' The United States Claims Court examined whether the execu-
tive traditionally has had the authority to settle claims of United States
nationals.02 The government argued that the embassy workers who re-
mained in Iran assumed an apparent risk that they might be subject to
terrorist activities. 0 3 In this unfortunate event, the employees also as-
sumed that the President would intervene and act on their behalf.10'
The court, focusing on the power of the executive to intervene in emer-
gency situations where American interests are at stake, held that the
98. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 734 (1987), affid, No. 87-1631 (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at
858 F.2d 706). See YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 92 (1969) (holding that if
the plaintiffs in a takings claim are the principal beneficiaries of the governmental ac-
tion, then a taking cannot exist, even if the public also benefited).
99. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 733 (1987), affd, No. 87-1631 (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at
858 F.2d 706).
100. Government's Brief, supra note 14, at 14. See, e.g., United States v. Central
Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168-69 (1958) (closing mines did not constitute a
taking because the reallocation of resources during wartime constituted an essential
governmental and public purpose).
101. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 733 (1987), afd, No. 87-1631 (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at
858 F.2d 706) (quoting Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 242-43
(1983), aFfd mem., 765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985)).
102. Id. at 734.
103. Government's Brief, supra note 14, at 11.
104. Id. The government argues that it is not bound to compensate the hostages
because it was trying to protect them. See YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 92
(1969) (holding that no taking exists when damage occurred to building while federal
officers were trying to protect it).
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government's activity was neither novel nor unexpected. 1 5 The United
States Claims Court deferred to the executive, acknowledging his
power to make decisions in foreign policy matters.10 6 Although the ex-
ecutive has often exercised his power to settle the claims of nationals,
the settlement is, oftentimes, in exchange for a lesser legal remedy. 0°
The novelty issue may therefore be a triable issue of fact because the
hostages could not have expected a complete forfeiture of their tort
claims against Iran.10 8
The final inquiry of the five-part takings clause analysis is whether
the governmental action substituted any rights for those rights that it
destroyed. 09 Although the government secured the release of the\hos-
tages, it failed to give any significant tort remedies to the claimant§. °
Accordingly, the claimants argued that if the court viewed their free-
dom as a sufficient quid pro quo for the nullification of their tort
claims, then the court would, in effect, legitimize Iran's tortious act of
seizing and detaining the hostages."'
The hostages in Belk v. United States, asserting that they received
no substitute legal right or remedy, distinguished Shanghai Power v.
105. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 734 (1987), affid, No. 87-1631 (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at
858 F.2d 706). Accord Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 245
(1983), aff'd mem., 765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985) (stat-
ing that the possibility always exists that the executive will interfere in the settlement
of a claim that affects foreign relations, and this possibility is a shared benefit and
shared risk of traveling abroad for business or pleasure).
106. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 736 (1987), affid, No. 87-1631 (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at
858 F.2d 706). See infra notes 115-31 and accompanying text (discussing the applica-
tion of the political question doctrine).
107. See infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text (explaining that, unlike the
facts in Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, the Algerian Accords offered no legal
remedy for the hostages in exchange for the extinguishment of their claims).
108. See General Declaration, supra note 6 art. 11 (noting the elimination of all
hostage claims arising under United States law, Iranian law, or international law, as
opposed to a Claims Tribunal that is available for commercial claims).
109. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 733 (1987), affid, No. 87-1631 (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at
858 F.2d 706).
110. See Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 99-399, § 802, 100
Stat. 879, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5569 (Supp. IV 1986) (providing fifty dollars to each
hostage for each day of captivity); Hostage Relief Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-449, 94
Stat. 1967, codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5561-62 (1982) (providing other mis-
cellaneous benefits such as lost salaries, and medical and educational expenses, rather
than just compensation for the pain and suffering of the hostages and their families).
11. Respondents' Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 14, Belk v.
United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732 (1987), aff'd, No. 87-1631 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 22, 1988)
(WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at 858 F.2d 706)
[hereinafter Hostages' Brief].
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United States.' In Shanghai Power, the executive settled plaintiff's
breach of contract claim for a reduced amount of twenty million dol-
lars.113 The hostages distinguished the Shanghai Power case by arguing
that the executive completely extinguished their legal right to sue in
tort, without providing an alternative legal remedy.114 A triable issue of
fact therefore exists regarding whether the hostages' freedom is a right
that adequately substitutes the dismissal of the hostages' tort claims
against Iran.
In the five-part takings clause analysis, the government conceded
that the Algerian Accords completely impaired the hostages' right to
sue Iran in tort." 5 The hostages may have difficulty arguing that the
Accords did not serve an important governmental purpose, and the hos-
tages may even lose on the novelty factor due to the court's characteri-
zation of presidential power. Nevertheless, the court's analysis of the
five-part takings test still raises two triable issues of fact. A triable is-
sue of fact exists as to the extent to which the claimants are incidental
beneficiaries; and the extent to which the government substituted rights
for those that it destroyed. Arguably, even if no triable issues of fact
existed, the United States Claims Court should have decided, as a mat-
ter of law, that the government's act constituted a taking of property
without just compensation.
While the five factors provide the United States Claims Court with a
useful takings clause analysis, those factors alone are not controlling.
The United States Supreme Court in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City held that there is no established formula for determining
when a taking without just compensation exists."" Acknowledging this
principle, the United States Claims Court emphasized the importance
of the traditional nature of executive decision-making.1 7 An overriding
concern of the United States Claims Court was not whether a taking
existed, but whether the court should probe into politically sensitive
issues.
112. Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 CI. Ct. 237, 239 (1983), a d mere.,
765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985).
113. Id.; Hostages' Brief, supra note 111, at 15.
114. Hostages' Brief, supra note 111, at 14.
115. Belk v. United States, 12 CI. Ct. 732, 734 (1987), affd, No. 87-1631 (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at
858 F.2d 706).
116. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) (holding that
the particular facts of each case determine a taking).
117. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 735-36 (1987), afJ'd, No. 87-1631 (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at
858 F.2d 706).
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B. POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
In Belk v. United States, the United States Claims Court relied on
the political question doctrine to dismiss the claims of the hostages.11
The court, examining the nature of the governmental action, deter-
mined that it involved the executive's ability to conduct foreign affairs,
and to eliminate sources of international friction between the United
States and the Islamic Republic of Iran."' Many courts have empha-
sized the importance of limiting the judicial review of foreign policy
matters.120
Judge Robb, for example, noted the importance of foreign policy
considerations in his concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic. 2' Judge Robb concurred with the dismissal of the case sim-
ply because the case involved a politically sensitive area. 22 Not all
judges agree with Judge Robb's opinion, however. For instance, in Von
Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 23 Judge Barrington D.
Parker held that the Constitution does not give the executive exclusive
control over foreign affairs.' 24 Judge Parker insisted that when adjudi-
cating an act involving the treatment of diplomats, the political ques-
tion doctrine should not apply.' 25
In defending against political question assertions, the plaintiffs in
Belk v. United States relied on E-Systems, Inc. v. United States. The
court in E-Systems did not invoke the political question doctrine, but,
instead, analogized the presidential taking in the area of foreign policy
to a legislative taking involving only national interests. 12 The court in
Belk v. United States, however, rejected the logic of E-Systems.12 7 The
118. Id.
119. Id; See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679 n.8 (1981) (stating that
the executive holds the power to settle international claims of American citizens); Ac-
cord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
213 (1965) (suggesting that the President may waive or settle claims of a United
States national against a foreign state).
120. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (discussing a background on
how courts use the political question doctrine).
121. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
122. Id.
123. Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C.
1985).
124. Id. at 259; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 461-62
(1964).
125. See Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 258-
59 (D.D.C. 1985) (stating that when treating diplomats, no fear exists that other politi-
cal branches will be embarrassed).
126. E-Systems, Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 271, 275 (1983).
127. Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 735-36 (1987), affd, No. 87-1631 (Fed.
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court noted the delicate nature of foreign policy negotiations"2 8 and
viewed the Algerian Accords as beyond the purview of judicial
scrutiny. 129
The plaintiffs further argued that the political question doctrine was
not an issue because judicial inquiry into the sensitive diplomatic nego-
tiations was not necessary, 130 and that the Claims Court need not sec-
ond guess the decisions of the executive.131 As the Federal Circuit
Court held in Langenegger v. United States, when the sole issue is the
lawfulness of the government's deprivation of the property owners' in-
terests without just compensation, it is unnecessary to probe into the
sensitive negotiations of the executive." 2 In such a case, the claim is
therefore justiciable and subject to judicial review.' 33 The Langenegger
court also clarified that if the court determined the government's act
was a taking, then such a holding is not equivalent to a judgment that
the government's act was reprehensible. 134 The court need only deter-
mine whether a taking existed, and whether compensation is appropri-
ate. No judicial inquiry into the sensitive negotiations of the executive
is necessary.
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit Court did not adopt this analysis
of the Claim's Court's takings clause and political question decisions.
The Federal Circuit Court affirmed the decisions of the Claims Court,
and upheld the summary judgment decision in favor of the United
States. 35 For the purpose of this Case-Comment, however, it is a
worthwhile exercise to hypothesize what would happen if the Federal
Circuit Court overruled the United States Claims Court's decision on
summary judgment, and held that: (1) triable issues of fact remain as
to whether a taking of the hostages' property existed; and (2) a deter-
mination of a taking would not require judicial review of delicate for-
eign negotiations. Under this holding, the Federal Circuit Court should
have remanded Belk v. United States back to the United States Claims
Cir. Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at
858 F.2d 706).
128. See id. (noting that secrecy in foreign policy negotiations is important, and
that judicial review of executive decision making is dangerous and potentially damag-
ing to future foreign policy negotiations).
129. Id.
130. Hostages' Brief, supra note 111, at 26.
131. Id.
132. Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 824 (1985).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Belk v. United States, No. 87-1631 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW,
CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at 858 F.2d 706).
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Court.
V. THE POTENTIAL REMAND OF BELK V. UNITED
STATES: THE ISSUE OF PROPERTY
If the Federal Circuit Court decided to remand Belk v. United
States to the United States Claims Court, the government would have
argued that the hostages never had any property, and, therefore, no
taking occurred. 3 ' The Court would then have to determine whether a
potential tort claim is a property interest. 37 Two standards exist to de-
termine if the tort claims of the hostages are property. The first stan-
dard requires that the hostages prove that they could have obtained
jurisdiction over the Islamic Republic of Iran in United States district
court under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 38 (FSIA), absent
the Algerian Accords. 39 The United States government, defendant in
both Belk v. United States and Shanghai Power Co. v. United States,
formulated its argument according to this standard. 4 '
The United States Claims Court, in Shanghai Power Co. v. United
States, offered a second standard for determining whether a tort claim
constitutes property.' 4 ' The second standard has two steps. First, the
court need not determine whether the plaintiffs could have obtained
jurisdiction over the foreign state,142 but only whether the claim has the
136. See Government's Brief, supra note 14, at 7 (stating that the government will
assume that the claims of the plaintiffs constituted property solely for the purposes of
the summary judgment motion); Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 733 (1987)
(noting that for the purposes of the summary judgment motion, the government con-
ceded that the hostages' tort claims against the Islamic Republic of Iran constituted
property), aff'd, No. 87-1631 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database,
1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at 858 F.2d 706).
137. Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 238 (1983), ajd mere.,
765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985). See supra note 79 (citing
past case law to support the proposition that property interests need not have physical
attributes to give rise to fifth amendment protection). The United States government
may argue that the hostages do not have a compensable property interest in an interna-
tional claim against Iran. Note, The U.S.-Iran Accords, supra note 7, at 1561. The
government would make three arguments. Id. First, it is too difficult to compute how
much the plaintiff should receive; second, the plaintiff should not expect compensation
on an international claim; and third, the circumstances of the hostage crisis gave rise to
an emergency situation where executive discretion was imperative. Id.
138. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1603-1611
(1982).
139. Shanghai Power v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 240-41 (1983), afl'd mem.,
765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985); Government's Brief,
supra note 14, at 7 n.3.
140. Id.
141. Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 240-41 (1983), affd
mem., 765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985).
142. Id. at 241.
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law in "back of it."143 The Shanghai court determined that this phrase
meant that, regardless of whether the plaintiffs could find a forum in
which to sue Iran, international and domestic law must support their
claim.' Second, to determine whether the property had any value, the
Shanghai court held that the plaintiffs would not only have to prove
they could have overcome jurisdictional obstacles, but also that they
could have succeeded against all possible defenses that the foreign state
would have put forward, and could have obtained satisfaction on a
judgment against the foreign state. 4
Because it is uncertain which standard the court in Belk v. United
States would have adopted to determine whether the hostages' claims
against Iran constituted property, this Case-Comment will only respond
to the first standard. In Belk v. United States, the government's only
argument concerning whether the tort claims constituted property was
that the hostages did not possess any property because a forum did not
exist in which the hostages could have obtained jurisdiction over
Iran.'46 It is beyond the scope of this Case-Comment to address every
possible defense that Iran would raise. In addition, this Case-Comment
will not deal with the problems of obtaining satisfaction on a judgment
against Iran.
A. FINDING A FORUM
To prove that their lost tort claims constituted property, the hostages
would first have to find a forum where they could have sued Iran. The
International Court of Justice would not hear the case because it only
hears cases to which states are parties. 1417 The United States-Iran
143. Id.; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979).
144. Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 CI. Ct. 237, 241 (1983), affd mem.,
765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985).
145. Id. at 241-42. Compare The U.S./lIranian Hostage Settlement, supra note 7,
at 245 (arguing that in the absence of the Algerian Accords, the hostages must show
that they could have recovered damages from Iran) with Seery v. United States, 127 F.
Supp. 601, 606-07 (Ct. Cf. 1955) (holding that plaintiffs deserved the amount the
United States took without requiring a showing that plaintiffs would have succeeded in
their claim against the foreign country). See The U.S./Iranian Hostage Settlement,
supra note 7, at 245 (commenting that perhaps the hostages would not have to prove
that they could have received compensation from Iran on a tort claim).
One commentator analogized the hostage situation to that of prisoners of war in a
foreign country, noting that our domestic tort law does not cover such suits. Id.
146. Government's Brief, supra note 14, at 7 n.3.
147. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34 (1945), reprinted in
DOCUMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 61 (S. Rosenne ed. 1979). The
International Court of Justice does not hear private claims. Id.
The United States brought a claim against Iran in the International Court of Justice
prior to the Algerian Accords. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consu-
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Claims Tribunal, expressly created for arbitrating all claims against
Iran and Iranian nationals, is also not available to the hostages because
the Algerian Accords explicitly barred all hostage claims.148
Plaintiffs claim that they could have sued Iran in Iranian courts
under Iranian law.149 The government argued that the plaintiffs could
not have sued Iran in Iranian courts because Iran did not waive its
sovereign immunity in its own courts.18 0 If, however, the hostages sue
the individual captors, the 1955 Treaty of Amity between the United
States and Iran may give the hostages access to Iranian courts. 15 Arti-
cle 3 of the Treaty of Amity states that foreign nationals have access to
the courts of Iran in pursuit of their rights.8" This article may grant
foreign nationals access to Iranian courts, but still may not waive the
Iranian government's immunity to be sued. In any event, the hostages
realistically would have elected to forgo filing suit in Iranian courts
because the Iranian justice system potentially would have been unfair
to the hostages,183 and, in addition, reappearing to bring a lawsuit in a
hostile country could have presented dangers to the plaintiffs. A more
plausible forum for the hostages is a United States district court.
B. ESTABLISHING JURISDICTION OVER IRAN IN UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT UNDER THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
The plaintiffs must initially decide who the plausible defendants
are. 54 Because it is difficult to locate the actual captors, the analysis of
lar Staff in Teheran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of May 24). In the Hos-
tages' Case, the court emphasized the importance of diplomatic immunity, and held
that Iran breached its obligations under international treaty law and custom. Id. at 37-
42. See Janis, The Role of the International Court in the Hostages Crisis, 13 CONN.
L. REV. 263, 276 (1981) (discussing the judicial opinions of the Hostages' Case).
148. General Declaration, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
149. See Hostages' Brief, supra note 111, Exhibit #1, Affidavit of Robert Eisenman
Re: Iranian Law (stating that hostages could have sued Iran in Iranian courts for
seizure and detention under Iranian law).
150. Government's Brief, supra note 14, at 7 n.3.
151. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights Between the
United States of America and Iran, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899, 902, T.I.A.S. No. 3853, [here-
inafter Treaty of Amity].
152. Id. at 902-03.
153. See Belk v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 732, 734-35 (1987) (commenting that
Iran has no civilized doctrine of just compensation), aff'd, No. 87-1631 (Fed. Cir. Sept.
22, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA database, 1988 WL 96763) (to be reported at 858 F.2d
706).
154. See Cooper, Hostage Rights: Law and Practice in Throes of Evolution, 15
CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 61, 111 (1983) (commenting that hostages seeking compen-
sation can sue anyone who is not immune, including the home government, the inter-
veners, and even non-officials with a duty to protect the interests of the hostages). The
hostages could potentially sue the United States or Iran on a negligence theory. See id.
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this Case-Comment will only address the claims that the hostages
could have raised against the Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact, the only
plausible claims that would give weight to the hostages' argument that
their tort claims constituted property would be in a suit against Iran.
Before a United States district court can hear the merits of the
claims of the hostages against Iran, the claimants must establish per-
sonal and subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act (FSIA). 1 5 To establish personal jurisdiction over Iran,156
the plaintiffs must properly serve the agents or instrumentalities of the
foreign state located in the United States,""7 and must discern an ex-
ception to Iran's sovereign immunity for the seizure of the hostages.16 8
The FSIA confers subject matter jurisdiction if the foreign state is not
entitled to sovereign immunity under the Act.159 Quasi-in-rem jurisdic-
tion16 0 is unavailable when suing a foreign state.10 1 The FSIA effec-
tively precludes attachments of a foreign state's property in the United
States in order to obtain jurisdiction, and allows attachments only to
satisfy a judgment. 62
at 116-117 (discussing negligence suits against home states regarding inadequate police
protection). A plaintiff, who was kidnapped in a foreign country while working for an
American corporation, could sue his employer for inadequately securing his or her re-
lease. Curtis v. Beatrice Foods Co., 481 F. Supp. 1275, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd,
633 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1981).
If the hostages can locate the captors, they can theoretically sue them for an inten-
tional tort. Abramovsky, Compensation for Passengers of Hijacked Aircraft, 21 Bur-
FALO L. REV. 339, 341 (1971). Compare id. (arguing that victims can and should sue
their captors). But see Comment, Deterring Airport Terrorist Attacks and Compensat-
ing the Victims, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1134, 1159 (1977) (arguing that intentional tort
suits against captors are not worthwhile because of the difficulty of locating the cap-
tors, obtaining jurisdiction over them, and collecting on a judgment against them).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (a), (b) (1982).
156. Id. § 1330(b).
157. Id. § 1608 (a)(4).
158. Id. § 1605. The plaintiff's claim must fit into one of the exceptions to sover-
eign immunity enumerated in this section. Id.
159. Id. § 1330(a). If the foreign state has sovereign immunity under sections
1605-07, then the court has neither subject matter, nor personal jurisdiction. Id.
160. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 189 (1977). Quasi-in-ren jurisdiction is
based on the attachment of property within the jurisdiction of the forum, as well as the
due process requirements of minimum contacts. Id.
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1982). The statute only provides for personal jurisdic-
tion, not quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. Id.
162. Id. § 1330(b), (c). Section 1609 declares that all attachments are immune
except those in sections 1610 to 1611. Id. § 1609. Section 1610 states that the only
types of attachments prior to judgment that the FSIA allows are those attachments
that the foreign state explicitly waives, or those attachments that are to secure the
satisfaction of a judgment that has been or may be entered against the foreign state.
Id. § 1610.
One legal scholar, Robert von Mehren, reviewing the commercial cases against Iran,
noted that the courts allowed attachments solely to obtain security, and not jurisdic-
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Iran would likely assert the sovereign immunity defense in response
to claims by the former hostages. 163 The doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity limits the power of a United States court to secure jurisdiction
over Iran."" The FSIA, modeled after a state long-arm statute, codifies
pre-existing customary international law on sovereign immunity into
United States law. According to the FSIA, a foreign state is generally
immune from the jurisdiction of United States federal courts, unless
the foreign state expressly or impliedly waives its immunity,165 or the
United States is a signatory to an international agreement which pro-
vides for jurisdiction over the foreign state,"6 or the foreign act fits into
any one of the five exceptions enumerated in section 1605 of the
FSIA.16 7
tion. The U.S.-Iran Hostage Settlement, supra note 7, at 243. A Presidential procla-
mation authorized the Iranian asset freeze. Exec. Order 12,170, 3 C.F.R. § 457 (1979).
Upon seizure of the embassy, and the threatened withdrawal of assets from the United
States banks, 200 claimants attached Iranian assets. Note, The U.S.-Iran Accords,
supra note 7, at 1538-39 (1982).
163. See Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(asserting the sovereign immunity defense in response to a suit brought by a former
hostage seeking damages for injuries inflicted during seizure of the United States em-
bassy in Teheran); McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 585 (9th Cir.
1983) (same).
164. See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812)
(stating the basic theory of sovereign immunity, by granting friendly foreign warships
immunity from jurisdiction in United States courts). Traditionally, foreign states have
been immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state. Id. See also Berizzi
Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926) (holding that even commercial ships
used for public purpose are not subject to jurisdiction in American courts).
In 1952, the United States began to employ a restrictive theory of sovereign immu-
nity, granting immunity only when the foreign sovereign acted in a public capacity.
The Tate Letter, 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
Professor Andreas Lowenfeld argued that the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity
precluded any claims that the hostages would have had against Iran. The U.S./Iranian
Hostage Settlement, supra note 7, at 244. Traditionally, an individual had no private
right of action against a foreign sovereign under international law; the private right
merged into the right of the individual's state. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW §
155b (8th ed. 1955).
165. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1982). A foreign state may implicitly waive its immunity
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act if it agrees to subject itself to the law of
another state court. Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea,
693 F.2d 1094, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).
Sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense; parties must plead it specifically and
timely, or else the court will deem that the state waived its immunity. H.R. Rep. No.
1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
6604, 6616 [hereinafter USCCAN]. If the state fails to appear at trial, the court must
make an independent determination of the state's immunity. Letelier v. Republic of
Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 667 (D.D.C. 1980).
See infra notes 204-209 and accompanying text (discussing possibilities of an im-
plicit waiver of sovereign immunity).
166. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982).
167. Id. § 1605(a)(1)-(5).
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The only exception of the five that is applicable to the hostage situa-
tion is the noncommercial tort claim.""' The exception permits noncom-
mercial tort claims against a foreign state only when the tort occurs in
United States territory."6 9 A number of courts have defined the United
States Embassy as the territory of the receiving state, Iran, and not the
sending state, the United States.7 Under this interpretation, the
American embassy in Teheran is located in Iranian territory, and the
alleged torts against the hostages, having occurred in the embassy, may
not fit within the exception to sovereign immunity for noncommercial
tort claims.17 1
As an alternative, Judge Harry T. Edwards, dissenting in Persinger
v. Islamic Republic of Iran,72 suggested that, although the court has
no jurisdiction over a hostage's claim for damages occurring in an em-
bassy, 7 3 the court would have jurisdiction if the parents or spouse of
the hostage brought the claim. 7 4 Judge Edward's rationale is that the
tortious injury, loss of consortium, or emotional distress occurred in the
United States.' Nevertheless, the majority opinion in Persinger v. Is-
168. Id. § 1605(a)(5).
169. Id. If a foreign state commits a tortious act in the territory of the United
States, the state will not receive immunity. Id. If the tortious act is also illegal, the
foreign state cannot argue that the act was a discretionary function of the foreign state.
Id. § 1605(a)(5)(A). See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C.
1980) (holding that a foreign sovereign does not have "discretion" under the terms of
the FSIA, to commit an assassination).
170. See Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(contending that United States embassies abroad are not territories of the United
States); McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 588 (9th Cir. 1983) (con-
tending that a United States embassy remains the territory of the receiving state).
171. Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1982). See also Harris v. VAO Intourist Moscow, 481 F. Supp.
1056, 1057, 1065-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (granting the Soviet Union sovereign immunity
for a wrongful death action in the Soviet Union); Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F.
Supp. 264, 265-66 (D.D.C. 1978) (granting immunity in a wrongful death action be-
cause the tort occurred in Iran, not in the United States).
172. Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 843-44 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., dissenting).
173. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1982) (stating that suits in tort are an exception
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act when the tort occurs in the United States).
The American embassy in Iran is not the property of the United States for jurisdic-
tional purposes. Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 839 (D.C. Cir.
1984); McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 588 (9th Cir. 1983).
174. Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 84344 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., dissenting).
175. See id. (arguing that the FSIA states that the plaintiff must prove only that
the tortious injury occurred in the United States, and stating nothing concerning tor-
tious acts). But see Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 842-43 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (stating that it would be unfair to prohibit relief for a hostage, but would
grant the parents relief on the grounds that their injury occurred in the United States);
USCCAN, supra note 165, at 6619 (specifying that both the tortious injury, and the
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lamic Republic of Iran held that the tortious act must accompany the
tortious injury under section 1605 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act. 1 6 Therefore, because the tortious act of seizing and detaining the
hostages occurred in Iran, the court could not obtain jurisdiction over
Iran under section 1605(a)(5) of the FSIA.
Even without an explicit exception under the FSIA, some cases and
commentators have suggested that gross violations of human rights pro-
vide an exception to sovereign immunity, 77 while others have asserted
that any violation of international law is enough to constitute an excep-
tion to sovereign immunity. 78 A third theory is that the international
agreements exception to the FSIA, outlined in sections 1330 and 1604
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,1 79 exempts all treaties, con-
ventions, and even customary international law from sovereign immu-
nity.'80 In Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 8' the
District Court for the District of Columbia applied some of these theo-
ries to deny the Soviet Union sovereign immunity in an action involving
tortious act must occur in the territory of the United States).
176. Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
177. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888-89 (2d Cir. 1980) (imposingjurisdiction over an agent of the state for violations of human.rights); Letelier v. Re-
public of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980) (imposing jurisdiction over a
Chilean state agent for the alleged murder of Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier in the
United States); Paust, Federal Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism
and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law under the FSIA and the
Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 223 (advocating non-immunity when a
state violates human rights).
178. See Paust, supra note 177, at 241 (arguing against foreign sovereign immu-
nity for violations of international law). The author argues that by granting jurisdic-
tional immunity, the United States violates international law. Id. at 227. See also Ex
Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1942) (granting federal courts jurisdiction over Nazi
war criminals that violated the law of nations); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 153, 153 (1820) (permitting subject matter jurisdiction over piracy in viola-
tion of the law of nations); Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830
F.2d 421, 426 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988) (holding that
sinking a neutral ship on the high seas constitutes a violation of international law, and,
therefore, Argentina may not receive the protection of sovereign immunity); Interna-
tional Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences (1946), reprinted in
41 Am. J. INT'L L. 172, 221 (1947) (rejecting Nazi war criminals' use of the foreign
sovereign immunity defense).
179. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1604 (1982). Section 1330 excludes from immunity appli-
cable agreements to which the foreign state is a party. Id. § 1330. Section 1604 ex-
cludes from immunity any prior agreements to which the United States is a signatory.
Id. § 1604. Subsequent international agreements are also exceptions to sovereign im-
munity under the FSIA. USCCAN, supra note 165, at 6608.
180. See Paust, supra note 177, at 235 (suggesting that the international agree-
ment exception includes customary international law).
181. Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C.
1985).
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the wrongful death of a diplomat.182
The district court's first reason for denying immunity was that a for-
eign state may not receive sovereign immunity for clear violations of
universally accepted international law. 183 The Von Dardel court stated
that it had jurisdiction over certain violations of international law
under the universality principle of international jurisdiction.'" Simi-
larly, in Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, the Sec-
ond Circuit utilized the universality principle to obtain jurisdiction over
Argentina when Argentina sank a neutral vessel on the high seas in
violation of international law. 185 The universality principle permits in-
ternational jurisdiction over claims against heinous international crimes
such as piracy, slave trade, genocide, war crimes, hijacking, and possi-
bly crimes against diplomats. 88 One of the oldest rules of customary
international law that has been codified in Congressional statutes and
international conventions, involves diplomatic immunity and consular
protection.1 87 Ideally, these rules of custom enable diplomats to negoti-
ate in a potentially hostile state without fear of death or capture.
182. Id. at 251-52.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 254.
185. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 425-26
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
186. Paust, supra note 177, at 201; RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1988). Paust suggests that universal juris-
diction applies to all crimes affecting the international community and violating inter-
national law. Paust, supra note 177, at 211-15. See also Blakesley, United States
Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRINI. L. & CRabIINOLOGY 1109, 1140
(1982) (arguing that the universality principle may also encompass acts of terrorism).
United States case law has granted jurisdiction over selective violations of interna-
tional law. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 36 (permitting jurisdiction over Nazi war
crimes violating the laws of war and international law); United States v. Smith, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 153 (1820) (permitting subject matter jurisdiction over piracy in
violation of the law of nations); Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic,
830 F.2d 421, 426 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1987) (allowing
jurisdiction over a foreign state for sinking a neutral vessel on the high seas, which the
court analogized to piracy).
187. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1960, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (1960) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, opened for signature Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T.
1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167, G.A. Res. 3166, 28 U.N.G.A.O.R. Supp.
(No. 30) at 146, U.N. Doc. A/9030, arts. 3, 6, 7, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 43 (1974)
[hereinafter Convention on Internationally Protected Persons] (codifying customary in-
ternational law of diplomatic protection into multilateral treaties). See 18 U.S.C. §§
1116, 1201 (1982) (codifying parts of the Convention on the Protection of Internation-
ally Protected Persons into United States domestic statutory law); 22 U.S.C. § 254
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (codifying the Diplomatic Convention into United States stat-
utory law); see also Treaty of Amity, supra note 151 (codifying certain consular pro-
tection into a bilateral treaty between Iran and United States).
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The Islamic Republic of Iran violated domestic and international law
when Iran seized persons under diplomatic protection.188 Two federal
court cases have held that the FSIA should not protect foreign states
when they violate international law.189 In one case, Von Dardel v.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the district court emphasized the
legislative intent of the FSIA to preserve all existing remedies for viola-
tions of international law. 190 To the extent possible, courts are to inter-
pret all federal statutes consistently with the law of nations.91 There-
fore, courts should construe the FSIA in a manner consistent with
international law. 19
2
In Amerada Hess Shipping Co. v. Argentine Republic, the court of
appeals held that because international law would deny immunity to
the foreign state, the FSIA must also deny immunity to the foreign
188. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran
(U.S. v. Iran) 1980 I.C.J. 3 30-42 (Judgment of May 24) 30-42 (holding that Iran
violated custom and treaty law regarding the treatment of diplomats and the inviolabil-
ity of the embassy).
Iran violated a number of articles of the Vienna Convention. Vienna Convention,
supra note 187. Iran violated article 22 of the Diplomatic Convention by entering the
American embassy in Teheran, and alternatively, not protecting the embassy from in-
trusion. Id. art. 22. Iran, denying all members of the embassy the right to move about
freely in the Iranian territory, violated article 26 of the Diplomatic Convention. Id. art.
26. Iran violated article 29 by detaining the diplomats and their staff, and alternatively,
by failing to protect them from any attack or affront on their dignity or freedom. Id.
art. 29.
Iran also violated the Treaty of Amity between the United States and Iran. Treaty
of Amity, supra note 151. Iran violated article 2 of the Treaty of Amity by disallowing
the American hostages to travel freely, and alternatively, by failing to provide the for-
eign nationals with protection and security. Id. art. 2. Iran also acted in violation of
article 2 when it detained the hostages without promptly informing them of the charges
against them. Id. Iran violated article 13 of the Treaty of Amity by failing to ensure
privileges and immunities to consular officials, and by failing to prevent local authori-
ties from entering the consulate. Id. art. 13. Finally, Iran violated article 18 of the
Treaty by failing to preclude local jurisdiction over consular officials. Id. art. 18. See
Convention on Internationally Protected Persons, supra note 187, arts. 3, 6, 7 (protect-
ing internationally protected persons from kidnapping, killing, and affronts on the their
liberties).
189. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 426 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988); Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 254 n.9 (D.D.C. 1985).
190. Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 254 n.9
(D.D.C. 1985).
191. See MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 434 (1913) (holding that courts
should engage in statutory construction of statutes in light of the purpose of the govern-
ment to act within the principles of international law, the observance of which is essen-
tial to the peace and harmony of nations); Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 253 (D.D.C. 1985) (stating that courts should interpret
federal statutes in a manner consistent with the law of nations).
192. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 426 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988). See USCCAN, supra note 165, at
6613 (noting that the FSIA incorporates established international law standards).
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state.193 The court also stated that Congress did not specifically intend
to contradict the standards of immunity in international law.' 9 ' To in-
terpret the FSIA consistently with international law, a United States
federal court should therefore not grant Iran sovereign immunity under
the FSIA because Iran violated international law regarding the treat-
ment of diplomats.
The district court in Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics also denied the Soviet Union sovereign immunity based on the fact
that the FSIA is subject to international agreements to which the
United States is a party.195 The United States is a party to the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 98 the 1973 Convention on Inter-
nationally Protected Persons, 9 7 the International Convention Against
the Taking of Hostages,' 98 and the 1955 Treaty of Amity between the
United States and Iran. 99 Consequently, these conventions and treaties
may fit into the international agreements exception of the FSIA.200
193. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 426 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
194. Id. at 16. Unfortunately, many sources view the FSIA as the sole and exclu-
sive standard that the court must use in adjudicating the issue of sovereign immunity.
USCCAN, supra note 165, at 6610; Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461
U.S. 480, 496-97 (1983); O'Connell Machinery Co. v. M.V. Americana, 734 F.2d 115,
116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1084 (1984).
195. Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 254-55
(D.D.C. 1985).
196. Vienna Convention, supra note 187. See 22 U.S.C. § 254 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986) (codifying the Diplomatic Convention into United States statutory law).
197. Convention on Internationally Protected Persons, supra note 184. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 1116, 1201 (1982) (codifying parts of the Convention on Internationally
Protected Persons into United States domestic statutory law).
198. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, arts.
5, 6, 8, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 245, U.N. Doec. A/34/46
(1980), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979) [hereinafter Hostage Convention).
199. Treaty of Amity, supra note 151.
200. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1604 (1982). One commentator suggests the possibility
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights fits into the international agreements
exception of the FSIA, by raising the Newman-Berkely argument. Lillich, The Role of
Domestic Courts in Enforcing International Human Rights Law, 1980 A?&t. Soc'y
INT'L L. 20, 22 (1980); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (111),
3 U.N. GAOR (183d mtg.) at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal
Declaration]. Because the United States is a member of the United Nations, and voted
for the passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United States is
bound by the obligations within the Universal Declaration. See United Nations Com-
mission on Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Islamic Re-
public of Iran by the Special Representative of the Commission. Mr. Reynaldo
Galindo Pohl, appointed pursuant to resolution 1986/41, 43 U.N. ESCOR (Agenda
Item 12) at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/23 [hereinafter Human Rights Report] (not-
ing the binding authority of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on all mem-
bers of the United Nations including Iran). The Newman-Berkely argument advocates
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights when read together with the United
Nations Charter becomes a self-executing treaty. Comment, The Foreign Sovereign
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That is, if any of these international agreements constitutes an excep-
tion to the FSIA, Iran would not receive sovereign immunity, and the
federal court could decide to grant jurisdiction over Iran.
The final factor that the Von Dardel court considered in denying
immunity was that the Soviet Union had waived its sovereign immu-
nity.201 An explicit waiver exists when a foreign state has signed a
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, which denies juris-
dictional immunity under certain circumstances. 2  Although the
Treaty of Amity may waive Iranian immunity for some commercial
claims,20 3 Iran has not given an explicit waiver regarding hostage
claims.
In Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the court
noted the ambiguity surrounding one party's implicit waiver.04 Legal
scholars, according to the court, have suggested that in ratifying inter-
national human rights agreements, a state agrees to a binding effect,
and implicitly waives immunity.20 5 Iran, as a party to the Diplomatic
Convention20 6 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,20 7 may have implicitly waived its immunity against being sued.
Immunities Act and International Human Rights Agreements: How They Coexist, 17
U.S.F. L. REV. 71, 85-86, 89 (1982) [hereinafter Comment: FSIA and Human Rights
Agreements].
201. See Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 255-
56 (D.D.C. 1985) (explaining the theories of explicit and implicit waivers of immunity,
and holding that the Soviet Union implicitly waived its immunity); 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(1) (1982) (codifying foreign state waiver provision).
202. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1982).
203. See Treaty of Amity, supra note 151, art. XI, § 4 (waiving Iranian immunity
for commercial activity in the United States).
204. Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 255-256
(D.D.C. 1985).
205. Id. See R. LILLICH AND F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 76 (1979) (noting the ambiguity of when an implicit
waiver will apply); Comment, FSIA and Human Rights Agreements, supra note 200,
at 82 (suggesting that article 56 of the United Nations Charter, read with the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, may amount to an implied waiver of immunity in
human rights claims). But see The U.S./Iranian Hostage Settlement, supra note 7, at
247 (1981) (asserting that if a foreign state does not expressly waive its immunity in a
United States court, then the foreign state has absolute immunity under the terms of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
206. Vienna Convention, supra note 187.
207. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter International Covenant]. Iran and the
United States are both signatories to the International Covenant, but the United States
did not ratify it. Id. Iran violated article 9 of the International Covenant because Iran
arbitrarily detained the hostages without a trial. Id. art. 9. Iran violated article 12
because Iran denied the hostages freedom of movement in, out of, or around their
country. Id. art. 12.
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Unfortunately, courts have interpreted waivers narrowly, and are disin-
clined to find that a foreign sovereign has waived its immunity. 08
If the hostages could have proven that a district court would have
obtained jurisdiction over Iran under the FSIA using any of the theo-
ries enunciated in Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
then the United States Claims Court, upon remand, may have found
that the hostages' claims against Iran constituted property. The court
would then apply the takings clause analysis, and would decide whether
the government's nullification of the hostages' claims against Iran con-
stituted a taking of property without adequate compensation. 09 If,
however, the United States Claims Court, upon remand, would have
adopted the standard set forth in Shanghai Power Co. v. United States,
then the hostages would not only have had to prove that a United
States district court would have obtained jurisdiction over Iran under
the FSIA, but also that the hostages could have overcome all of Iran's
possible defenses, 210 and recovered actual damages on a judgment
against Iran.2"
208. See Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 376-78 (7th
Cir. 1985) (holding that failure of a nation to defend itself against a suit brought
against it did not constitute waiver of its sovereign immunity); see also Berkovitz v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 735 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1035
(1984) (holding that sovereign immunity is not merely a defense, but its absence is
jurisdictional requirement).
209. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V (requiring that no person be deprived of property
without due process); see also supra notes 82-115 and accompanying text (discussing
the applicability of the five-part takings clause analysis).
210. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964) (af-
firming the use of the act of state doctrine). The act of state doctrine prevents United
States courts from adjudicating foreign state acts that occur in the territory of a for-
eign state, even if the act of the foreign state conflicts with United States policy. Id. at
398.
The act of state doctrine poses a severe threat to human rights litigation; if the court
recognizes this defense, the claims of the hostages would have no effect. Comment,
Torture as a Tort in Violation of the Law of Nations: Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 33
STAN. L. REV. 353, 363-64 (1981). The doctrine hinders efforts to enforce anti-terrorist
measures through traditional United Nations human rights channels. See Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 457 (1964) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the act of state doctrine should not be used as a shield for violations of interna-
tional law).
Many human rights commentators have supported efforts to discard the act of state
doctrine if a state raises the defense to shield the state's acts that violate international
law. See Paust, supra note 177, at 221, 243 (advocating that a court should not grant
the act of state defense when the foreign state violated international law); see also
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421 n.21 (1964) (noting that,
historically, the act of state doctrine did not necessarily apply to violations of interna-
tional law). Another approach limits the doctrine in refusing to recognize the defense
when an act in a foreign state has effects outside the state. Paust, supra note 177, at
246.
211. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-10 (1982) (codifying provision for post judgment at-
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VI. REMEDIES FOR THE HOSTAGES
If the Federal Circuit Court had remanded the decision of the
United States Claims Court in Belk v. United States for a reassessment
of the takings clause analysis, and if the plaintiffs could have overcome
the obstacles of the political question doctrine and the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act, then the hostages may have had an opportunity
to obtain a judicial remedy. Because, however, the Federal Circuit
Court upheld the decision of the Claims Court, the hostages must look
toward other avenues to receive a remedy. As one commentator has
indicated, many hostages or victims of terrorism are bitter about their
sufferings, and desire compensation.212
In the past, the only remedies that victims of state-sponsored terror-
ism could realistically receive were inadequate ex gratia settlements. In
one example, the Federal Republic of Germany paid over three million
marks to the families of the Israelis killed at the Olympics, without
claiming responsibility for their deaths.2 13 In another example, the
United States House of Representatives in 1987 passed a bill granting
reparations to those Americans of Japanese descent whom the United
States detained during World War Two.214 This bill would distribute
$1.2 billion to the survivors, or $20,000 to each victim of the Japanese
internment.1 5 Although these two ex gratia settlements provide partial
compensation to the victims, they are meager in comparison with tort
damages awarded in United States courts.
Similarly, the United States offered limited ex gratia compensation
for the American hostages in Iran, amounting to only fifty dollars for
each day of captivity. 16 The Hostage Relief Act 17 offered the hostages
other miscellaneous benefits, such as guaranteeing the hostages their
tachment of assets located within the United States); supra notes 158-59 and accompa-
nying text (explaining that attachments to satisfy a judgment with respect to property
taken in violation of international law are legitimate under the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act). It is beyond the scope of this Case-Comment to deal with these issues in
depth.
212. Mathewson, The Terrorists: Bitterness Surrounding Dutch Train Hijacking
Lingers A Year Later, Wall St. J., Jan. 6, 1977, at 1.
213. See Cooper, supra note 154, at 113 n.156 (discussing West German payment
to the families of Israeli athletes killed at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games).
214. See H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (implementing payment of pre-
scribed sum to Japanese-Americans as damages resulting from internment during
World War 11).
215. Id.; W. McAllister, Amends Sought For 1940s Internment, Washington Post,
Sept. 12, 1987, at 1.
216. Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 99-399, § 802, 100 Stat.
879 (1986).
217. Hostage Relief Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. §§ 5561, 5562 (1980).
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salaries, and extending certain medical benefits, as well as some educa-
tional expenses to the families of the hostages.218 If the goal of United
States was to offer the hostages monetary compensation for their pain
and suffering, in light of the fact that the Algerian Accords nullified
the hostages tort claims against the Islamic Republic of Iran, then the
compensation should have been more substantial. In its present form,
the settlements do not constitute just compensation for the lost tort
claims of the hostages.
With the Algerian Accords, the United States achieved important
foreign policy objectives, as well as a Claims Tribunal for American
commercial claimants. The hostages received their freedom, and mea-
ger ex gratia settlements, but not a legal remedy in return for the dis-
missal of their tort claims against Iran. The United States made an
important decision in signing the Algerian Accords. The United States
should take responsibility for that decision, and should grant the hos-
tages just compensation for their lost claims for pain and suffering.
Without adequate ex gratia settlements, the hostages' only alterna-
tive means of receiving monetary compensation for their pain and suf-
fering was to sue the United States. The hostages could have sued the
United States under a takings clause theory or a negligence theory.
They chose the takings theory, but the United States Claims Court
dismissed their complaint. Because Belk v. United States was affirmed,
the hostages will never receive adequate compensation for their
sufferings.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
On the appeal of Belk v. United States, the Federal Circuit Court
should have closely examined the takings clause analysis of the United
States Claims Court. The court of appeals should have found that tria-
ble issues of fact exist in at least two of the five parts of the takings
clause test. Triable issues of fact exist as to the extent to which the
claimants are incidental beneficiaries, and the extent to which the gov-
ernment substituted rights for those that it destroyed. In addition, the
court should have found that, because it need not probe into the sensi-
tive nature of executive decision-making, the takings clause issue is not
a political question. Thus, the circuit court should have reversed and
remanded the decision of the United States Claims Court.
If the Federal Circuit Court had remanded Belk v. United States
back to the United States Claims Court, the government may have ar-
218. Id.
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gued that the hostages never possessed property. The hostages would
then have had to prove that they could have established jurisdiction
over the Islamic Republic of Iran in a United States federal court. To
allow the hostages to satisfy this jurisdictional requirement, the United
States Claims Court, on remand, would have had to follow the ration-
ale set forth in Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and
hold that a federal district court could have obtained jurisdiction over
Iran because: (1) seizing and detaining internationally protected per-
sons is a universal violation of international law;2 19 (2) the various in-
ternational agreements, to which Iran is a signatory, fit into the inter-
national agreements exception of the FSIA;220 or (3) Iran implicitly
waived its immunity by signing various international human rights
agreements. 21 Therefore, the United States Claims Court should have
found that a United States district court would not grant Iran sover-
eign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Because
the hostages could have obtained jurisdiction over Iran in a United
States court, their claim constituted property that the government com-
pletely destroyed when it signed the Algerian Accords. The hostages
should have had an opportunity to collect compensation for their tor-
tious injuries through judicial channels.
A number of possibilities exist to ensure that future hostage victims
receive adequate compensation. The legislature could amend the FSIA
to include human rights violations as an exception to sovereign immu-
nity.222 Because it is difficult to pass legislation that may directly affect
the executive's foreign policy power, judges could rely more on custom-
ary international law or international agreements as exceptions to the
FSIA. Human rights advocates should focus their energy on encourag-
ing the courts to grant greater legal effect to customary international
law.228 Civil sanctions and remedies can and should exist even without
219. Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 254
(D.D.C. 1985).
220. Id. at 254-55.
221. Id. at 255-56.
222. See Conference Report: Human Rights in American Courts, 1 AM. U.J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 137, 161 n.74 (1986) (suggesting the codification for an exception for
violations of human rights as an amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
223. See Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 427(2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988) (noting that one must look to
modern international law to decide whether the statute provides jurisdiction over a for-
eign sovereign); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that
the law of nations is an evolving set of principles that must be examined as they exist
today, not as they existed in 1789); see also Schneebaum, International Law as Guar-
antor of Judicially-Enforceable Rights: A Reply to Professor Oliver, 4 Hous. J. INT'L
L. 65, 79 (1981) (advocating the extended reliance on customary human rights law in
United States courts).
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a statute.224
CONCLUSION
Through the seizure of the American hostages in Teheran, Iran vio-
lated both domestic United States law and international human rights
law. The hostages' tort claims against Iran could have resulted in mon-
etary compensation, and therefore constitute property. The signing of
the Algerian Accords by the United States constituted a taking of the
hostages' property without providing just compensation. The United
States Claims Court in Belk v. United States should not have granted
summary judgment for the government because there were triable is-
sues of fact concerning whether a fifth amendment taking occurred.
The court was primarily wary of interfering in a political question, al-
though no investigation into sensitive political negotiations was neces-
sary to determine whether there was a taking.
Courts must not be fearful of dealing with foreign policy matters, or
relying upon international law. Based upon international custom and
treaty law, hostage victims should be allowed to overcome domestic ju-
risdictional obstacles such as the doctrine of foreign sovereign immu-
nity. The hostage victims would then be able to receive the compensa-
tion that the trier of facts deems appropriate. Without judicially
mandated compensation, or more substantial voluntary ex gratia settle-
ments, the hostages will receive little for their pain and suffering.
224. See The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 53 (1897) (noting that courts can enforce
the law of nations both civilly and criminally without the passage of any jurisdictional
statute).
